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Anne Schiffer 
School of Art, Architecture & Design, Leeds Beckett University, Room A305, Broadcasting Place, Woodhouse 
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Abstract 
In this paper, we explore the practices and spaces of mobile phone charging in The Gambia and Sierra Leone 
through the lens of ‗electricity scarcity‘ as a means to conceptualise electricity access in West Africa. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) is seen as the leading authority on the state of global energy access, and is 
frequently cited by government and non-government bodies. We, however, suggest that the IEA‘s quantitative 
and binary framing of electricity access is analytically problematic for understanding energy poverty. Using 
ethnographic methods, including observation and semi-structured interviews, we provide insights into the 
changing socio-technological, socio-political and socio-economic dimensions of mobile phone charging 
including its relationship with the built environment. Comparing mobile phone charging in The Gambia and 
Sierra Leone, clearly shows that the notion of absolute electricity scarcity which is promulgated by IEA 
statistics only offers a limited picture of energy poverty, especially at the locale. Instead, drawing on political 
ecology scholarship, we propose a concept of political electricity scarcity as an approach enables a more human-
centred and nuanced understanding of how energy poverty operates or is mitigated through community-based 
structures or at a household level. By reframing energy poverty issues through this lens, we are able to illustrate 
the role that political economy dynamics play in shaping the electricity flows in rural Sub-Saharan Africa and 
who ultimately gets what kind of electricity access.  
Keywords  
Energy poverty; mobile phone charging; scarcity; energy sufficiency; Sub-Saharan Africa; electricity access 
Declarations of interest: none 
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1 Introduction 
Electricity access statistics are often used as a proxy to map out global energy poverty. For example, the first 
indicator of the United Nations‘ Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG7) – which in effect seeks to eliminate 
energy poverty by 2030 – is measured as the ―proportion of population with access to electricity‖ (indicator 
7.1.1) (UN 2015). To inform this indicator, the United Nations (UN), like other major international agencies, 
draws on statistics produced by the International Energy Agency (IEA) (cf. Wu and Wu 2014). Electricity 
access, in these statistics, being defined as the presence of a direct supply of electricity, and consumption above 
a minimum threshold of 250 kilowatt-hours (kWh) per year in rural settings and 500 kWh per year in urban 
areas (IEA, 2015). Drawing on these statistical parameters, the IEA (2017) (and therefore, by proxy, the UN) 
currently estimates that 1.1 billion people in the world ―lack access to electricity,‖ mostly affecting populations 
residing in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of ‗developing Asia‘. This geography of electricity access, however, is 
expected to change over the next decade with the IEA estimating that while globally there will be progress in 
terms of electricity access, electrification rates will struggle to keep pace with population growth in Africa. 
Therefore, by 2030, a projected ―600 million out of the 674 million people without access to electricity [will] 
live in Sub-Saharan Africa, a majority of them in rural areas‖ (IEA 2017, p. 3). In short, the IEA‘s projections 
suggest that a lack of electricity access will be a defining characteristic of future energy poverty in Africa (also 
see Onyeji et al 2012). 
Given its current, and likely future, prominence in African energy poverty debates, we argue that there is a 
critical need to theorise what ‗electricity access‘ actually means in an energy poor African context. In doing so, 
we suggest that the IEA‘s binary and quantitative understanding of electricity access is analytically problematic, 
and risks presenting electricity access as a simple infrastructural issue. In contrast, we propose that electricity 
access should be understood as a more qualitative process that is shaped by a range of political, social, economic 
and infrastructural dimensions. For example, electricity usually flows and is stored in a range of complex 
dynamics in energy poor contexts: some buildings and households might have access to electricity due to 
selected grid connections, access to diesel generators or solar photovoltaic installations; electricity is stored in 
disposable or rechargeable batteries to power radios, torches or mobile phones; and electricity flows through 
direct current (DC) outlets in different vehicles. Electricity, thus, is not totally absent in an energy poor context. 
Instead,  electricity is a part of localised energy cultures which shape who has access and who is excluded from 
these different ‗electricities‘. We draw on political ecology scholarship, specifically works that have engaged 
with socially constructed forms of ‗scarcity‘, what Scoones et al (2018) term ‗political scarcity‘,  to propose the 
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idea of ‗electricity scarcity‘ as a means to conceptualise the geographies of electricity access and flows in Sub-
Saharan Africa. That electricity flows (or lack thereof) are not just a function of infrastructure, but rather are 
shape by a range of political, social and economic processes. 
We ground this conceptual argument in empirical case studies of mobile phone charging in The Gambia and 
Sierra Leone. The focus on the simple task of charging a mobile phone allows us to explore and contrast the 
complex socio-technological, socio-political and socio-economic dimensions of energy scarcity in relation to 
electricity access. Ultimately, the rise of mobile phones in Africa illustrates the analytical limits of the binary 
‗electricity access‘ framing used by the UN, because the current estimates that around 43% of Africans own a 
mobile phone (GSMA 2017) makes a mockery of UN‘s claim that a vast majority of people in rural Sub-
Saharan Africa ―function without electricity‖ (UN 2017). The vast majority of African household do function 
with electricity – from the very simple fact that they need to find ways to charge their mobile phones. It is the 
political economy dynamics that surround this ‗functioning‘ that is the interest and focus of this paper. 
1.1 Framing electricity scarcity 
Resource scarcity can be described as a resource that is ―in short supply‖ - however, what causes the ―supply‖ to 
become ―short‖ is a key focus of resource scarcity debates. On the one hand, an influential body of work 
surrounding scarcity presents it as a largely arithmetic concern. In this Malthusian framing, scarcity is the 
product of population numbers versus the quantity of resources available (Homer-Dixon, 1996, 1999; Kaplan, 
2000, 2001, 2012; Ehrlich, 1968; Smail, 2002). Scarcity thus occurs when population numbers outstrip the 
―carrying capacity‖ of a given resource. This framing of ‗scarcity‘, however, has been the focus of critique by a 
broad body of work under the banner of political ecology, which explores the various social, technological, 
economic and political dimensions that shape environmental access, use, and other resources, across spatial and 
temporal scales (Robbins, 2012; Budds, 2008). In doing so, this work reveals the ―winners and losers, hidden 
costs, and the differential power that produces social and environmental outcomes‖ (Robbins, 2012, 11). There 
is a particular emphasis on questions of ―whose scarcity‖ to explore the social constructions of scarcity and their 
implications (Mehta, 2007; Budds, 2008). As such, a political ecology perspective sees resource scarcity as 
being the product of power-laden social dynamics as well as material availability (Scoones et al., 2018). As 
Melo Zurita et al. (2015, 172) note, from a political ecology perspective, the notion of scarcity ―is not absolute 
or naturally-given, but rather it is considered to be socially produced. This is not to deny that scarcity is a 
function of physical conditions, rather it emphasises how it can also be a function of human actions, cultural 
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norms and perceptions, historical conditions, societal inequities, and the loci of control over ...  critical 
resources‖  (also see Johnston, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2009; Mehta, 2010). ‗Political scarcity‘ is thus understood 
as being shaped by variety of material and discursive processes. 
Most political ecology work thus far has focused on resources that are directly available ―in nature‖, for 
example water (Kaika, 2003; Bakker, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2009; Mehta, 2001, 2007; Budds, 2008), and non-
renewable resources including fossil fuels, particularly relating to their potential relationship to conflicts (Le 
Billon, 2001, 2012; Peluso and Watts, 2001; Watts, 2004; Marriott and Minio-Paluello, 2012). Much of the 
work on water has demonstrated how hegemonic discourses of ‗scarcity‘ have been mobilised to justify 
neoliberal approaches to governance, which is built on the logic that the market offers the optimal mechanism 
for the allocation of presumably scarce water resources (Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Swyngedouw, 2009; Melo 
Zurita et al., 2015). It is a logic that political ecology perspectives counter, as Swyngedouw (2009, 58) argues 
―true scarcity does not reside in the physical absence of water in most cases, but in the lack of monetary 
resources and political and economic clout‖ thus water scarcity is more of a production of ―the economic and 
political power relations through which access to, control over, and distribution of water is organized.‖ Water 
scarcity, therefore, is usually a product of political scarcity that is shaped by political economy dynamics, rather 
than absolute scarcity (cf. Scoones et al., 2018). 
Similar arguments can be seen with the political ecology scholarship relating to fossil fuels that has challenged 
‗environmental determinist‘ accounts of resource scarcity as a major cause of conflicts around the world (cf. 
Kaplan, 2000, 2001; Homer-Dixon, 1996, 2010). Peluso and Watts for example, in their edited collection 
Violent Environments, offer an incisive and direct critique of the Malthusian influenced environmental 
determinist accounts. They reject ―automatic, simplistic linkages‖ that are made between notions of scarcity and 
violence, instead arguing that ―violence should be understood as ―a site-specific phenomenon rooted in local 
histories and social relations yet connected to larger processes of material transformation and power relations‖ 
(Peluso and Watts, 2001, 5). They further note that scarcity is surprisingly untheorized in determinist accounts, 
and that rather presuming or starting with scarcity, analyses of ―violence should begin with the precise and 
changing relations between political economy and mechanisms of access, control, and struggle over 
environmental resources.‖ They conclude that ultimately all forms of scarcity are historically and 
environmentally ―produced expressions of these relations‖, and therefore it is flawed to use scarcity alone as the 
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starting point for analysis (Peluso and Watts, 2003, 93). Thus, similar to political ecology work on water 
scarcity, they see politically-crafted scarcity, rather than absolute scarcity as being the key analytical concern. 
In this paper, we conceptually draw upon this political ecology scarcity scholarship, however our application to 
electricity is novel for two reasons. First, unlike water and fossil fuels, electricity (at least in its consumed form) 
is not found ―in nature‖ but produced. Indeed, electricity is often the end product of exploited water (e.g., hydro-
electricity) and/or mineral resources (e.g., coal, oil). Thus, biophysical factors have less influence in electricity 
geographies. Second, our focus is on everyday practices. Rather than grander questions of governance and 
conflict that has pervaded much of the political ecology literature, we are interested in the day-to-day 
geographies of electricity flows. As such, this paper contributes to a smaller body of emerging literature that 
explores electricity scarcity in the context of local energy cultures (e.g., Parks, 2016). 
Framing electricity as scarce in Sub-Saharan Africa is a relatively straightforward proposition. For example, in 
2015 the IEA estimated that Africa as a whole generated around 3% of the world‘s electrical supply, while it is 
home to around 16% of its population (IEA 2017). Even then, the 3% figure was predominantly made up from 
generating capacity based in South Africa and the more industrialised nations in North Africa (Sovacool et al., 
2016). These figures, at face value, represent an absolute scarcity of electricity across the continent, however, a 
critical question to ask is: to where, and to whom, does this limited electricity flow towards? Overall figures 
obscure the more complex geographies of electricity flows across the continent. And, problematically, they 
imply that the African electricity problem is solely an infrastructural one – a technical managerial problem that 
requires techno-centric solutions. Indeed, such framing has been discursively mobilised to promote neoliberal 
reforms, similarly to water scarcity issues. The privatisation of electricity generation, distribution and supply , 
especially during the 1980s and 1990s (Bhattacharyya, 2012), has been promoted as a ‗solution‘ to combat 
electricity scarcity in Africa. And, despite the prediction that the reforms would bring an end to energy crises 
(Gore, 2009), electricity access problems remain pernicious following neoliberal reforms (Bhattacharyya, 2012). 
In Uganda, for example, privatisation has mainly succeeded in making electricity more expensive, rather than 
generating more widespread access, especially in rural areas (Gore, 2009, 2017; also see Brew-Hammond et al., 
2014). In contrast, by focusing on political scarcity of electricity a more complex political economy of 
electricity geographies can be revealed and thus it is refocused as a key energy justice concern (cf. Sovacool, 
2012; Sovacool and Dworkin, 2004; Jenkins et al., 2016, 2018; Munro et al., 2017; McCauley, 2018). Here, the 
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opposite of scarcity is therefore not how to delivery abundant infrastructure, rather sufficient energy in the 
context of everyday practice - providing electricity is a political ecological, rather than solely technical, concern. 
2 Methodology 
The methodology for data collection across the two case studies of The Gambia and Sierra Leone are 
largely based on a range of qualitative (e.g., interviews, ethnographic observation) methods, with some 
complementary quantitative data collection (e.g., surveys). In The Gambia, field work has been part of a 
larger design action research project that includes phases of immersion and mapping. Regular field excursions 
since 2010 enable a longer-term perspective of changing energy practice including charging mobile 
phones. Relationships established with members of the Kartong community early on in the research have led 
to being hosted in a local family compound which enabled immersions and participation in local life. 
Immersions have been carried out throughout different times of the year including dry and rainy seasons as 
well as Ramadan to avoid ‗season blindness‘, the limited understanding of local life based on experience of a 
single season (Chambers, 2012, 38). Immersion is supported by ethnographic methods including 
observation, photography and semi-structured interviews. The latter includes interviews with elders 
conducted as part of a recent collaboration with the National University of Ireland (NUI) Galway about 
past energy transitions. In addition, the research used mapping of infrastructure distribution across the 
settlement area to provide insights (also see Schiffer, 2016). This was carried out using Google Earth 
images and physically walking through the settlement area to record data such as electricity connections to 
compounds.  
In Sierra Leone, data and insights are derived from numerous research projects that have been conducted 
in-country since 2006. This includes twelve-months fieldwork in 2006-2007, three months in 2008 and six 
months in 2011 as well as 2012. During fieldwork, time was predominately spent working on and investigating 
energy projects in the north of Sierra Leone, across the districts of Kenema, Port Loko, Moyamba, 
Kambia, and Bombali. This has been supported by observation of energy practice as well as interviews with 
key stakeholders working in energy sector of Sierra Leone. Furthermore, an extensive survey of mobile phone 
charging stations was carried out as part of a European Union (EU) funded project in 2014-2015.  
While originating in geography and design disciplines as well as being conducted over different timescales, the 
use of ethnographic methods across research in The Gambia and Sierra Leone allows for the comparison of 
both case studies as outlined below. With regard to energy in the built environment, the two case studies 
differ in terms of scenarios of infrastructural development. The Gambian case offers insights into changes
to mobile 
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phone charging practice, including the move to domestic buildings with the introduction of grid electricity, 
whereas mobile phone charging in rural Sierra Leone is currently realised through a range of off-the-grid 
electricity options.  
3 Case studies: mobile phone charging in the context of electricity scarcity 
According to the IEA (2017), Sub-Saharan Africa has a 43% electrification rate. At the same time, the region  is 
the fastest growing mobile phone market in the world. Between 1999 and 2004, which coincides with the 
introduction of mobile phones in The Gambia and Sierra Leone, mobile phone subscriptions on the continent 
leaped from 7.5 million to a staggering 76.8 million (Dowden, 2009, 518). Unique subscriptions continue to rise 
and are expected to reach half a billion in 2020 (GSMA, 2017).   
The following case studies explore the interface between the lived experience of mobile phone charging and the 
socio-technological, socio-political and socio-economic dynamics that shape the context of increasing demand 
for mobile communication and electricity scarcity.  
3.1 The Gambia: changing dynamics of phone charging with the arrival of grid electricity. 
Kartong is a rural coastal community and border village located in the south of The Gambia with a population of 
approximately 3,300 people (GBOS, 2013). It has undergone drastic changes in infrastructure development over 
the past several decades, including road construction and connection to grid electricity (Schiffer, 2016). Kartong 
elders still recall when there were only few radios in the community to access news, when the sound of a drum 
was used to gather people for important announcements and when information was transferred to other 
communities using a small number of bicycles.  
There was notable infrastructure development following the 1994 coup d’etat, in which Yahya Jammeh seized 
power. This included the launch of the first television station and the Gamcel mobile phone network in the late 
1990s (Harvey and Sturges, 2010). Other mobile phone operators entered The Gambia after the Millennium, 
including Africell in 2001, Comium in 2007 and QCell in 2009. In the 1980s, during the previous government, 
landline infrastructure was introduced but there was a high cost associated with getting connected and the 
technology was superseded by the mobile phone. As one Kartonka explains: ―Frankly …. the landline usage … 
was dropped significantly because of the introduction of the mobile phone. Since you have your mobile in your 
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hand you don‘t need to use the landline. As mobile companies started coming up, the Gamtel line started 
collapsing because you don‘t need it anymore‖ (Personal Communication, Jan 2018).   
Until 2013, when grid electricity became available in Kartong, mobile phones were charged off-grid. One of the 
two mobile phone masts (Africell) that continues to directly serve Kartong was located on the southern edge of 
the settlement area back then and powered by a large diesel generator (Fig 1). Those residing nearby could come 
here and charge their mobile phones for D5 (€0.09, US$0.11). The other phone receptor mast (Gamcel), which 
was powered by solar, was not accessible. However, the local health centre just across the road also had a solar 
installation where people charged phones. Perhaps the most popular charging locations were so-called video 
clubs, a form of local cinema that typically shows films and football. On top of the entrance fee to watch what 
was on the screen, people could pay D5 (€0.09, US$0.11) to have their phone charged. In other words, mobile 
phone charging provided additional income generation for businesses or their employees. At the same time, 
buildings that performed specific services such as providing health care or entertainment, also supplied 
electricity for the informal mobile phone charging sector.  
In addition, some businesses also charged mobile phones for free. Examples included a tailor who used a 
generator to power sewing machines, several light bulbs and a radio and recharged an estimated 25 mobile 
phones owned by local residents a day (Personal Communication, April 2013). Others may have had access to 
domestic solar cells or small diesel generators in extended family compounds though these were few and far 
between. As a result, electricity needs were largely met by batteries while people used fewer electronic 
equipment and gadgets. 
During the rainy season in 2013, the first 19 households in Kartong were connected to the electricity grid. At the 
time few could afford the D3,000 (€54; US$64) connection fee, as income generating activities are concentrated 
in the dry season and the connection also coincided with the end of Ramadan which is associated with large 
expenses to provide food and clothing (Schiffer, 2016). Despite the relatively low initial uptake of grid 
electricity the mobile charging businesses disappeared almost immediately. Close ties across the community 
means people help each other out. Therefore, a household that has access to grid electricity will share the said 
commodity with extended family, friends and those in need around it. With the arrival of grid electricity in 
Kartong mobile phone charging rapidly shifted from buildings associated with services to domestic dwellings.  
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The grid in Kartong only covers the more established parts of the settlement area leaving large parts 
disconnected.
1
 Few line extensions have been made since 2013 and these are predominately to large new 
residences of European expatriates and a wealthy politician. However, the majority of compounds in the area 
covered by grid are now connected. Consequently, domestic energy practices have changed as people have 
become accustomed to using electric kettles, fridges and televisions. In a context of continually distinct gender 
roles the home is traditionally the sphere of women who are benefitting as chores become less time consuming 
due to now available electrical gadgets. Some are also finding new ways to generate income, for example, by 
producing and selling local juices which are chilled in fridges. However, until recently women‘s education was 
seen as less important than that of men and therefore many women are illiterate (Greene and Schiffer, 2018). 
Not being able to read means these women are more likely to be excluded from the benefits associated with 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) such as mobile phones. The increasing demand for 
smartphone technology among the literate demographic since the introduction of grid electricity to Kartong 
exacerbates this. Therefore, moving electricity charging into domestic dwellings has arguably done little to 
address this type of access inequality. It also suggests that women‘s education and the alleviation of energy 
poverty in relation to ICTs needs to go hand in hand.  
Those who own mobile phones in Kartong often have two or more sim cards, multiple phones or dual-SIM 
handsets to get the best deals from different operators and overcome reception black spots. Choice of operators 
may also be influenced by additional services such as internet access or the ability to make payments for grid 
electricity top-ups locally known as ‗cash power‘. In addition, recharging mobile phones, which is more 
frequent for power hungry smartphones, is somewhat impacted by so-called load shedding - planned blackouts 
which are a symptom of the country‘s limited electricity generation capacity.  
1
 In 2015 The Gambia had an estimated electrification rate of 40% with rates in the Western Division of The 
Gambia, where Kartong is located, at 22%. (Blodgett and Marett, 2015). 
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Fig 1. Off-grid mobile phone receptor mast powered by a diesel generator. 
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3.2 Sierra Leone: the social enterprise of the phone charging station 
Mobile phone services first arrived in Sierra Leone in the wake of the country‘s civil war (1991-2001), with the 
telecommunications companies Celtel and Millicom (the latter known locally as ―Buzz‖, then ―Tigo‖) setting up 
operations in 2000. Initially, mobile network coverage was limited, and operating costs were high – phones and 
credit had to be purchased in US dollars. Thus, by 2004, only around 2% of the population, a small urban elite, 
could afford to own and use mobile phones (Sesay 2004). The market, however, rapidly expanded in 2005 with 
the arrival of two new operators, Africell and Comium, and by the end of 2005 an estimated 14.3% of the 
population owned a mobile phone (Bello-Bravo et al., 2017). Indeed, like in The Gambia, during this time it was 
not uncommon for people to own multiple mobile phones (or mobile phones containing dual sim cards) as 
different networks offered different advantages: some operators had greater coverage (e.g., Celtel), while others 
offered cheaper call rates (e.g., Africell). Since the mid-2000s, Sierra Leone‘s mobile market has continued to 
be dynamic: Millicom (―Tigo‖) was bought out by Africell in 2009; Comium went bankrupt in 2014; and Celtel 
has been through multiple acquisitions, most recently being bought by (and being renamed as) Orange, a French 
telecommunications company, in 2016. The Cypriot telecommunications operator ―Smart Mobile‖ launched 
mobile services in Sierra Leone in 2014, while the Sierra Leonean (and former public company) landline 
operator SierraTel and The Gambian operator QCell are both in the process of introducing 4G services in 2018. 
Sierra Leonean mobile phone ownership is now claimed by over 50% of the population, while network coverage 
(over 80%) is widespread (Sam, 2015; Samarakoon et al., 2017). Mobile phone ownership and use rates will 
almost certainly continue to increase, as the influx of cheap smartphones from China, along the relatively low 
cost of pre-paid data plans, has enabled greater accessibility to poorer (although perhaps not the poorest) socio-
economic households (Sam, 2015). 
While the story of mobile phones in Sierra Leone has been a boom, the story of electricity access has been 
lacklustre. Since 2000, the year mobile phones were introduced, and while the country has attempted to recover 
from its civil war, the supply of electricity has remained a ―consistent and economically pernicious problem‖ 
(Munro et al., 2016, 29). Overall, the vast majority of grid electricity connections are limited to the capital city 
of Freetown and district capitals, leaving the rest of the country predominantly with little or no grid access 
(Munro et al., 2016). The IEA (2017) estimates that only 9% (12% urban, 6% rural) of the country‘s populace 
have direct access to electricity. Due to this severe national energy deficit, electrification projects have 
inevitably been focused on providing demand for urban centres – notably with the completion of the Bunbuma 
Dam project in 2009 – and plans for improved rural electrification remain largely aspirational (MEWR, 2009; 
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Pushak and Foster, 2011; Munro et al., 2016). Given the contrasting stories of rapidly expanding mobile phone 
ownership, and the stuttering of grid electricity provision, an ongoing quandary for many Sierra Leonean 
residents has been to find ways to recharge their mobile phones. Even the small amount of electricity required to 
recharge a mobile phone has become a precious commodity, readily sought out by a majority of the country‘s 
households. 
Fig. 2 Inside view of a charging station in the town of Blama, Kenema District, Sierra Leone.  Photograph taken 
by Energy For Opportunity (EFO). 
The answer to the mobile phone charging quandary has been answered in many rural contexts with the rise of 
small energy kiosks known as mobile phone ―charging stations‖. Usually set up by local entrepreneurs, these 
charge mobile phones for a tariff between 1,000 to 2000 Leones (€0.11-0.22; US$ 0.15-0.30). These charging 
stations are most commonly powered by small diesel generators, and use a mess of cables and plug extensions to 
maximise the number of phones that can be charged (see Figure 2). Most charging stations also include a light 
bulb placed in a prominent position on the exterior, and a large stereo blasting music (often by local artists) 
across the village. These are clearly visible and audible signs of electricity: the light bulbs so people can see 
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where electricity is available at night, the stereo so people can hear where electricity is during the day. As such 
the charging station operators have manipulated the sights and sounds of village life to attract their customers. 
Fig. 3 Charging Station in the Diamond Mining town of Sewafe, Kono District, Sierra Leone. Photograph taken 
by Energy For Opportunity (EFO). 
The charging station is a precarious business because the cost of purchasing diesel in most cases eats up more 
that 50%, and in some cases more than 80% of revenue. While the most popular energy source are small 
generators made by the tiger company – nicknamed the Kabba Tiger as a provocation of a former Sierra 
Leone‘s government inability to address electricity access issues (Sam, 2016) – these are ultimately stretched to 
operate for more than 12 hours each day to maximise revenue. Such constant use has its consequences and 
generator repairs have the potential to send operators broke. As one charging station operator from Sierra 
Leone‘s Kono District noted – generator problems often mean ―closing the station for a day or two‖ which 
ultimately results in ―losing customers‖. 
Charging mobile phones in Sierra Leone thus is a precarious negotiation that has shaped the dynamic political 
economy of electricity access. Households constantly need to find revenue, in many cases, up to 5% of a 
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household‘s income, to ensure their mobile phones are operational. This is an increasing concern as people in 
Sierra Leone gradually shift from using Nokia and similar type ‗brick phones‘ that require relatively irregular 
charging, to energy hungry smartphones (Samarakoon et al., 2017). At the same time, mobile charging station 
operators have to contend with the precarities of affording diesel fuel and generator maintenance to sustain their 
beacons of electricity supply for the rural energy scarce populace 
The days of the diesel-powered charging stations could well be numbered, due to new entrants into this 
energyscape. Non-government organisations and aid donors have increasingly co-opted the charging station but 
with one important difference: they are setting up mobile phone charging stations powered by built-in 
photovoltaic energy systems (Kemeny et al., 2014). These new – sometimes community-run, sometimes 
privately-owned – charging stations can effectively operate with minimal operating costs given their energy 
source is sunlight, although replacement batteries will present a future expense (see Kemeny et al., 2014). Some 
local entrepreneur charging stations are following this lead, buying their own photovoltaic modules to replace 
their diesel generators. However, this is a small minority, as the upfront cost of photovoltaic modules is 
prohibitive for most. Most rural Sierra Leoneans have limited access to large (or even moderate) amounts of 
financing, and therefore the smaller upfront cost of Kabba Tiger is more financially viable, despite its high 
operational costs. Furthermore, household-level pay-as-you-go small solar products, with international venture 
funding, are also emerging in Sierra Leone‘s markets, providing technical and financial innovations to make 
mobile phone charging accessible (Wogan, 2013; also see Rolffs et al., 2015). Despite these recent trends, 
electricity will still be scarce in rural contexts, though who will own and profit from the commodity of 
electricity in the context of mobile phone charging will likely shift dramatically. The scarcity will be shaped by 
changing political economy dynamics. 
4 Discussion 
The dynamic geographies of mobile phone charging in Sub-Saharan Africa illustrate how energy poverty in the 
region is not necessarily, as implied by the UN (2017) and other sources, about people ―functioning without 
electricity‖. Instead it is a more qualitative question of how people find different ways to function with 
electricity in attempting to meet their livelihood demands. What is effectively a non-existent cost in most 
wealthy countries,2 the charging of mobile phones for many Sub-Saharan Africa households is a substantial 
2
 One study, for example, estimated that people spend around US$0.24 a year on their daily charging of their 
smartphones in the United States (Helman, 2013). For a comparison, the same amount of phone charging in 
rural Sierra Leone would cost around US$95. 
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financial burden (up to 5% of income) and requires a constant negotiation of the changing political economies of 
electricity flows in rural contexts. The comparison of the case studies of The Gambia and Sierra Leone 
illustrates these nuances. While Kartong in The Gambia ‗gained‘ access to the grid electricity network in 2013 
and rural Sierra Leone largely remains off the grid, the two case studies do not show a simple binary of 
access/inaccess to electricity that pervades representations of energy poverty. Electricity is almost always 
present and flowing in energy poor contexts, it is what shapes these flows that deserves our analytical attention. 
The comparison of mobile phone charging in The Gambia and Sierra Leone ultimately provides a critical 
perspective of how energy poverty plays out at the local level and relates to wider economic, technological and 
political trends. The mobile phone charging sectors in both countries clearly demonstrates that everyday energy 
practice operates not in absolute electricity scarcity contexts, but rather contexts where relative scarce electricity 
flows are shaped by a range of different economic, social, cultural and political dynamics. 
Table 1: Overview of different models for mobile phone charging 
The Gambia Sierra Leone 
Business type Existing business or operation e.g. video 
club with additional charging facility 
Charging station with optional additional 
business 
Feasibility of 
business 
Largely replaced by grid electricity Viable business for now 
Power source Off-grid: Mainly diesel generators; some 
solar charging; 
On-grid: costly as mainly based on 
imported fossil fuels 
Mainly off-grid diesel generators. With some 
limited applications of photovoltaic power. 
Accessibility Illiterate women and older men excluded 
from benefits 
Based on socio-economic ability to be able to 
―pay‖ for the recharge. 
Smartphones Becoming popular since introduction of 
grid electricity  
Increasing need for charging that benefits 
business 
Other 
features 
Used to purchase ‗cash power‘ credit Used to purchase pay as you go solar credit 
Mobile phone 
operators 
Gamcel, Africell, QCell, Comium Africell, Orange, Sierratel, Smart Mobile, 
QCell (coming in late 2018).  
On the one hand, there is a straightforward economic dimension to the flows of electricity, whereby mobile 
phone charging has effectively become a commodity in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. It has become a business 
transaction, a for-profit opportunity for owners and/or operators of buildings that have some form of off-grid 
access to electricity. In The Gambian case, prior to grid access, these were structures which already serve 
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another purpose – for example that provided entertainment, mobile phone reception or healthcare – and were 
subsequently able to generate additional profit through charging mobile phones. Sierra Leone, in contrast, 
businesses had mobile phone charging as the central economic activity with specifically designed charging 
stations, although often these charging stations would frequently engage in additional income generating 
services such as selling drinks. Owners of these mobile charging businesses – whether they be charging stations 
in Sierra Leone or businesses with off-grid electricity in The Gambia – often needing to negotiate the 
fluctuations of both diesel supply and the challenges of generator maintenance. A precarious, nevertheless 
effective economy of accessible charging spaces for mobile phone users emerged in these electricity scarce 
contexts.  
The charging of mobile phones, however, is not a solely economic exchange. Access to charging was also a 
social transaction in both case studies. The lack of direct access to electricity infrastructure for many was 
mitigated through social structures that emphasise the sharing of available resources. For example, in The 
Gambia the tailor opted to recharge (around 25 a day) mobile phones for free, thus not viewing charges as a 
direct commodity. In Sierra Leone many residents, on occasion, find ways to recharge their mobile phones 
beyond the charging station economy, whether during trips in ‗bush taxis‘ (using DC outlets) or if they work at 
and/or visit an office with an operational generator. The arrival of the grid in The Gambia, although only 
reaching a small minority of households initially, immediately disrupted the dynamics of recharging, notably 
through the notion of extended family compounds. Since grid electricity became available in Kartong in 2013, 
the sense of sharing with friends and family has led to the shift of mobile phone charging from non-domestic 
structures to domestic dwellings, from an economic exchange to a social one. As such, mobile phone charging 
including the built environment in which this takes place, needs to be seen in wider socio-cultural (sharing) and 
socio-political (infrastructure development) contexts. Here, mobile phone charging has become less of a 
commodity and more of a socially shared resource. 
There is ultimately a political dynamic to these flows – there are some clear divisions in terms of who can 
access electricity for charging their mobile phones and the manner in which this is accessed. There is a socio-
economic dimension in the sense the poorest households are likely to be financially excluded due to the 
prohibitive costs of paying for charging station fees or, in the case of Kartong, paying to be connected to the 
grid. Wealthier households are also more likely to have family members working in (electrified) offices, own 
vehicles or use personal generators and therefore can live beyond the necessity of financing a daily mobile 
phone charge. Politics also influences the flows of electricity infrastructure and supply. The arrival of the grid in 
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Kartong did not translate to direct electricity access for all, rather the grid extension had a political and 
economic geography, with infrastructure only reaching parts of the settlement area and extensions focused on 
initially focused on wealthier or politically influential households - (electrical) power flows to the (economically 
and politically) powerful. Load-shedding, the decision to supply limited electricity production to different 
locations at different times also plays into this dynamic – the Government ultimately prioritise some populations 
(and industries) with electricity supply. The presence of a grid in Kartong, for example, does not guarantee the 
presence of reliable electricity flow. There are deeper structural factors at play. 
There is also a gendered dimension in that women, especially women with poor literacy skills, are likely to be 
excluded from the benefits of mobile phones. Different forms of energy poverty continue to exist within 
households, even if they have financial capability to pay for mobile phone charging. Indeed, GSMA (2017, 2) 
estimates that women in Sub-Saharan Africa are 17% less likely to own a mobile phone than men, and they are 
23% less likely to have access to internet. A household might own a mobile phone and be able charge it, but that 
does not mean all members have equal access – there are gender, and even ageist (i.e., illiterate elderly people of 
both genders being excluded) dimensions to these flows. 
Finally, the links between technology, infrastructure, social practices and economies are quite striking between 
the two case studies (see Table 1).  Technologies (e.g., smartphones, photovoltaic power) are mediated by the 
contexts into which they are thrust (Campbell et al., 2016), new technologies in particular have multiple and 
often unexpected uses that are intimately entangled with socio-cultural practices and processes involving 
questions of gender, politics, knowledge, meaning, value and ethics (Sovacool and Drupady, 2012). For 
example, unlike Sierra Leone, the informal mobile phone charging sector in The Gambian case did not benefit 
greatly from the introduction of smartphones that need more frequent charging as it roughly coincided with the 
arrival of grid electricity. Instead, the sector became obsolete while most buildings continued to fulfil their 
primary function. A notable exception is the structure associated with the diesel generator of the Africell 
receptor mast which lost its purpose as the mast was relocated within the settlement area and connected to the 
grid. However, Gambian grid electricity continues to rely predominantly on imported fossil fuels while the trend 
in Sierra Leone is moving from off-grid fossil fuels to off-grid solar. Here, the mobile phone charging sector is 
able to adapt to some extent, continuing to provide a community-based service and potentially inspiring off-grid 
solar systems in the home, at which point the charging station buildings need to change their primary purpose to 
remain relevant. Smartphones, electricity sources and social process are entangled in a range of different ways 
across the two case studies. 
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A question that remains is whether or not electricity solutions lift people out of energy poverty more broadly. 
Providing enough energy to charge mobile phones, is at a par with electricity to power electric light bulbs. In 
isolation, these are ‗limited opportunity models‘ that do not take into account the aspirations of people and the 
associated future energy use, thereby providing insufficient energy in the long run (Bhushan and Kumar, 2012, 
iv.; Schiffer, and Cadena, 2016). In the Gambian case, the availability of grid electricity has quickly led to the 
accumulation of more gadgets and equipment such as kettles, fridges and televisions at household level. In 
Sierra Leone this trend will likely follow as electricity becomes available at household level, mobile phone 
charging is integrated into the home and demand for other devices rises. 
5 Concluding remarks 
Comparing mobile phone charging in The Gambia and Sierra Leone clearly shows that the binary concept of 
absolute scarcity which is promulgated by the IEA is ill-suited in providing a detailed picture of energy poverty 
at the locale. Drawing on Scoones et al.‘s (2018) notion of ‗political scarcity‘, we have shown how electrical 
scarcity is shape by a range of political economic process across different scales, spaces and temporalities. 
Ultimately paying attention to these dimensions offers a more human-centred and nuanced understanding of 
how energy poverty operates or is mitigated at household and community level. This includes how structures are 
purpose-built or appropriated for mobile phone charging and how their energy function changes as new 
technology or infrastructure becomes available and communication culture changes.  
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